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I. INTRODUCTION
Under modern authority there is little doubt that an employer may be
held liable for an assault committed by his employee when the act is done
in the scope or course of employment.' There is some difficulty, however, in
determining what acts will qualify under this test. The employer is not
liable for all acts done by his employee, even if done during working hours.
The employer is held liable because there is a relationship between the act
and his business, not because he employed the person.2 A majority of courts
appears to use the motive of the employee as the determining factor. 3 For
an employee's conduct to fall within the scope of employment it must be
actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.
4
The test to be applied in Missouri is unclear. Some cases make intent
to serve the employer indispensable while others do not appear to require
such intent. In Wellman v. Pacer Oil Co.,' the court held that, irrespective of
purpose, an employer is not vicariously liable if the employee's assault was
so outrageous and excessively violent that it was unforseeable. The case left
undecided the question whether liability can attach in a situation where the
employer's business has been completed and the employee has no intent to
promote the employer's business.6 This Comment will demonstrate that
existing Missouri law supports the proposition that under certain circum-
stances an employee's assault can give rise to employer liability even though
the employee, at the time of the assault, was not intending to further any
1. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372 (1954).
2. State ex tel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 768, 41 S.W.2d 801, 805
(1931).
3. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372 (1954).
4. Milazzo v. Kansas City Gas Co., 180 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. 1944); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c) (1958).
5. 504 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. en banc 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
6. Id. at 57-58.
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interest of the employer. While intent to further the employer's interest
may often be sufficient to impose liability on the employer, lack of such
intent should not bar vicarious liability.
II. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
To say that an employer will be held vicariously liable only when the
tortious act of his employee was done in the scope of his employment is to
say little more than that the employer will be liable when the court decides
to impose liability. "Scope of employment" is a malleable expression that
courts have used when they have found it expedient to hold, or not to hold,
the employer liable.7 A brief review of the history of the expression will
show that the term is not a formula used to determine liability but rather a
conclusory label appended when liability has been found to exist.
Under early English law, an employer was not vicariously liable for the
unauthorized torts of his employee.' It appears that the earliest cases hold-
ing an employer liable where his employee caused harm involved either
direct negligence of the master, absolute liability for dangerous instrumen-
talities, or some representation by the employer that was relied on to the
detriment of a person who dealt with the employer through his factor.9
Thus, in Michael v. Alsetree,1° a master directed his servant to take two un-
trained horses to a public field to break them and make them fit for a
coach. The horse ran into a person, and the master was held accountable
for the injury. Here, although the servants may have handled the horses
negligently, the master's order was itself sufficiently negligent to warrant
imposing liability on him. " In Tuberville v. Stamp,' 2 a case that is often cited
as the progenitor of respondeat superior,13 an employer was held liable when
his servant kept the master's fire negligently, causing injury to a neighbor.
Tuberville turned not on liability for servants, however, but on the absolute
common law duty of a landowner to keep his fires. 4 The question whether
the servant at the time was acting for the master's benefit was relevant as a
limitation on the master's absolute liability-i.e., to prove whether the fire
7. Seavey, Speculations as to Respondeat Superior, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
433, 465 n.49 (1934). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 472-73 (3d ed.
1964).
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 470.
9. Factors were considered superior to other types of employees since they per-
formed ministerial duties. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 415 (1765).
10. 2 Lev. 172 (1672), discussed in Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 354
(1891).
11. See id.
12. 1 Ld. Raymond 264, 92 Eng. Rep. 671 (1672).
13.. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 19 (1916); Holmes, supra note 10, at
359.
14. See T. BATY, supra note 13, at 19.
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was actually the master's-not as a basis for imposing liability for negli-
gence within the scope of employment.' 5
It was not until after 1700 that a master was liable for the act of a
servant merely because the act was done while serving the master. In Hem
v. Nichols,' 6 a master was held liable for an agent's misrepresentation con-
cerning the quality of certain silks sold to the plaintiff. The rationale of the
case was that since the employer had invited the plaintiff to enter into con-
tracts with his agent, he should not be surprised if called upon to fulfill
those contracts.
17
Whether by the survival and expansion of early Roman or medieval
notions' 8 or by misapplication of the language in these and other cases,'
9
the doctrine was firmly established by the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury that a master was liable for the negligence of his servant in carrying out
the work of the master.2" The concept quifacit per alium, fadt per se, or "he
who acts through another acts through himself,"2 1 had evolved from the
causal argument that one who orders an act done is liable for the doing of
that act to a theory based on invited and justified expectations of apparent
authority and finally to the rule that one who orders an act done bears the
risk of negligence in the doing of the act even where no absolute duty or
invitation to repose confidence in the servant existed.22 One author has
described the master's liability in tort, aside from absolute duty and cases of
contract, as "a gigantic inverted pyramid whose apex is nothing but nisi
prius dicta."
2 3
For a time the courts would not extend liability of the employer to
15. Id.
16. 1 Salk 289, 90 Eng. Rep. 1154 (1709).
17. See T. BATY, supra note 13, at 11.
18. Holmes determined that the concept of employer liability had its roots in
slavery and the patria potestas of Roman law. Holmes, supra note 10, at 350.
19. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 419; see also T. BATY, supra note 13, at
22-25.
20. T. BATY, supra note 13, at 31; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its
Histoy7, 7 HARV. L. REv. 383, 402 (1894).
21. Brucker v. Fromont, 6 Term. Rep. 659, 101 Eng. Rep. 758 (1796), cited
Tuberville as authority for upholding the fiction that where a servant is acting in
service to his employer, the master is so acting. The plaintiff had alleged that the
defendant employer was driving his cart and negligently injured the plaintiff when
in fact the defendant was not present.- The defendant's servant was driving. The
case also cited Blackstone as authority for the proposition that a master is liable for
the negligence of his servant in the employ of his master. Blackstone, however, cites
as authority for this rule the fact that a master is liable for damages from a fire that
his servant negligently sets. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 419. Thus the
citation to Blackstone is in effect an additional citation to Tuberville.
22. See Wigmore, supra note 20, at 385; see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9,
at 417.
23. T. BATY, supra note 13, at 28.
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damages caused by unauthorized intentional torts, although their reasons for
doing so seem overly technical and strained today. In A'Manus v. Crickell,24
a servant willfully drove his master's chariot against the plaintiff's carriage.
The master was not held liable because "when a servant quits sight of the
object for which he was employed, and without having in view his master's
orders pursues that which his own malice suggests, he no longer acts in
pursuance of the authority given him, and. . his master will not be an-
swerable for such act."25 The court found that the servant gained a "spe-
cial property" of the master's instrumentality for a time."6 The distinction
made was that between trespass and an action on the case. Willful trespass
would not lie against the employer because all defendants in trespass cases
had to be principals; the master must actually have authorized the act to be
liable in trespass. In an action on the case, on the other hand, the employer
did not have to authorize the act to be liable for the employee's
negligence.
27
While the propriety of this distinction was questioned,28 it was trans-
ported to America as though it were deeply rooted in the common law.
29
The American authorities did not emphasize stark rules of pleading30 but
rather sought a justification for the rule based on the scope of employment.
It was held that the willfulness of the servant's act was the dividing line
because the relation of master and servant must subsist between the parties
"in the particular affair."3 1 An employee's negligence could give rise to
employer liability because "[i]t is of the very nature of business that it may
be well or ill done" and because "negligence in servants is so common, that
the law will hold the master to the consequences, as a thing that he is bound
to foresee and provide against. '32 Where the servant's act was willful, how-
ever, the law held the act to be a departure from the master's business even
if the willful act had been "done in the immediate performance of his
master's business." 33 No employer liability would arise.
24. 1 East 106, 102 Eng. Rep. 43 (1800).
25. Id. at 108, 102 Eng. Rep. at 44.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. G. REEVES, THE LAw OF BARON AND FEMME 518 (3d ed. 1867). See
Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, 344 (N.Y. 1838).
29. In Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, 347-48 (N.Y. 1838), the court stated,
"The line where the master's liability shall terminate must be placed somewhere;
and the acquiescence of Westminster Hall for many [38] years in the rule we have
cited as laid down by Lord Kenyon, is an evidence of the common law not to be
resisted . .. ."
30. The Wilcox court, in fact, noted that the line between trespass and case had
been blurred by statute. Id. at 348.
3 1. Id. at 345.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 346.
[Vol. 48
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Authority to do the act was said to be the basis of liability.3 4 The basis
was not authority to be negligent but authority to do the work out of which
the negligence and injury arose.35 But while the courts were willing to con-
clusively presume implied authority to do all lawful acts to achieve the em-
ployer's purposes, even where the employer had given express orders not to
do a certain act,36 they would not imply authority for willful wrongs. Scope
of employment simply did not include unauthorized intentional torts.
The distinction between intentional and negligent acts was adopted by
the Missouri Supreme Court in the early case of Douglass v. Stephens. 
37
While today Missouri courts do not so differentiate, 8 it is difficult to deter-
mine at what point the distinction was overruled due to the language of the
cases. In Garretzen v. Duenckel,3 9 the court held that a master would be liable
for an accidental injury even though the cause of the accident was willful
disobedience of the master's instructions, so long as the employee had acted
with the purpose of serving the master.4 The court stated:
The true ground upon which a master avoids responsibility for
most of the willful acts of his servants, when unauthorized by him,
is that they are not done in the course of the servant's employ-
ment. When they are so done, the master is liable for them ...
[The servant in this case] was unquestionably aiming to execute
the order of his principal or master. He was acting within the
scope of this authority and engaged in furtherance of his master's
business .... It makes no difference that he disobeyedinstructions. a
At first blush, this language appears to overrule (in dicta) the distinction in
Douglass. It appears to make motive to serve the employer as the test, even
if the injury was caused by an intentional unauthorized act of the em-
ployee. But the Garretzen court cited the distinction in Douglass with ap-
proval.42 A second reading of the above quotation shows that the court was
careful to state that the employee "was acting within the scope of this authority
and engaged in furtherance of his master's business."' 43 In effect, the Gar-
retzen court raised an irrebuttable presumption that an employee was au-
thorized to do any lawful act if it was done with a purpose to serve the
34. M'Manus v. Cricket, 1 East 106, 108, 102 Eng. Rep. 43, 44 (1800).
35. T. BATY, supra note 13, at 92.
36. Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 111-12 (1872) (not error to exclude
evidence showing that loading guns in store was not part of the business of selling
guns).
37. 18 Mo. 362, 367 (1853).
38. See, e.g., Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App., St. L.
1958).
39. 50 Mo. 104 (1872).
40. Id. at 1ll.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 109-10.
43. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
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employer. Since the Douglass distinction was based on the legal rule that no
authority will be implied to do an unlawful act,4 the cases are consistent.
Courts continued to cite the rule that an employer could not be held liable
for an intentional tort committed by his employee unless the act had been
expressly authorized.4 5
That Missouri courts have abandoned the distinction but have never
overruled Douglass can be explained by the vagueness of the term "scope of
employment" and by the language and facts of Missouri's leading case on
employer responsibility for torts of an employee, Haehl v. Wabash Railroad
Co.46 In Haehl, the defendant's employee was a watchman employed to
keep trespassers off the defendant's bridge. The plaintiff's decedent was
crossing the bridge and was confronted by the watchman. After some dis-
cussion-and a tap by a billy club-the decedent turned to go back. The
watchman then chased after the trespasser and shot and killed him. The
defendant contended that since the trespasser was already leaving the
bridge, no purpose of the employer was furthered by using excessive force,
and therefore the employer should be liable only if he authorized or sanc-
tioned such wanton and malicious killing.4 7 The court affirmed a judgment
against the defendant, stating that however wanton or malicious the act,
the employer is liable if it was done in the course of the servant's
employment.4 8
While Haehl has been cited for the proposition that an employer is
liable for his employees' assaults when done with an intent to serve the
employer,49 it is at least doubtful that the Haehl court intended to break
44. See Douglass v. Stephens, 18 Mo. 362, 367 (1853).
45. See, e.g., Jackson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 87 Mo. 423, 430 (1855) (dicta).
46. 119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737 (1893).
47. Id. at 338, 24 S.W. at 740.
48. Id. at 340-41, 24 S.W. at 741.
49. See Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Mo. App., St. L.
1958); see also Brown v. Associated Dry Goods, Inc., 656 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1981)
(store liable for assault by janitor where he acted in furtherance of store's interest);
Butler v. Circulus, 557 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977) (school could be
liable where employee made assault in attempt to further school's business). Such
an interpretation is probably attributable to application of cases in which employer
liability was denied because the assault was not done in an attempt to further the
master's business. In State ex re/. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 41 S.W.2d 801
(1931), the court discussed the Haehl decision and concluded: "The employee...
was engaged in the performance of his duty. . . in the course of carrying out his
idea of how his duty, of putting him off, should be performed. Therefore the de-
fendant was properly held liable." Id. at 766, 41 S.W.2d at 804. The court went on
to hold that the defendant's demurrer was properly sustained in the case before it
because "the assault was not shown to be incident to any attempt upon the em-
ployee's. . . part to do his master's business." Id. at 769, 41 S.W.2d at 805. While
the court's discussion mentioned that the watchman in Haehl had been authorized
to use force, id. at 760, 41 S.W.2d at 804, the negative inference of the two quoted
[Vol. 48
6
Missouri Law eview, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss3/4
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
with the established rule that an intentional tort is not within the scope of
employment absent express authority. This is evidenced by the court's
statement that the holding was not outside the authorities cited by the de-
fendants,5" by the fact that the court found no need to cite precedent for
what it considered a well-settled proposition,5 and by the care the court
took to point out that the watchman's job necessarily involved the duty of
"putting. . . [trespassers] off after they got on."5 2
The holding in Haehl was not in conflict with the intent/negligence
distinction. When an employer authorized an employee to use force for
certain purposes and the employee used excessive force to achieve those
purposes (i.e., shooting at a trespasser to make him get off of a bridge),
holding the employer liable was in accord with the prior rule.53 Two ratio-
nales for employer liability that did not change the basic distinction had
been advanced in other states. First, the court could find that the act was
not an intentional trespass but negligente in the performance of a lawful
act in the course of employment.5 4 Second, the court could find the action
to be one for trespass and consider the employer to have authorized the act.
That is, where an employee is authorized to use force at his discretion, the
"use of such discretion or force is a part of the thing authorized."5 5 Due to
the express finding in Haehl that putting trespassers off the bridge was a
part of the employee's duties, either of these rationales could be used to
make Haehl consistent with prior cases. Nonetheless, the broad language
used in Haehl has been read to impose potential liability for all acts done to
further the interests of the employer.
56
statements may appear to make motive the test. To the same effect, see Smothers v.
Welch & Co. House Furnishings Co., 310 Mo. 144, 148, 274 S.W. 678, 679 (1925)
(no employer liability for attempted rape by employee because he was "not acting
within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his master's business...
but, on the contrary, was pursuing his own ends for his own purposes").
50. Haehl, 119 Mo. at 340, 24 S.W. at 740.
51. "It is apparent without argument, upon the facts shown in evidence as they
appear upon the face of the foregoing statement, that all these requirements were
fully met by the plaintiff." Id. at 338, 24 S.W. at 741.
52. Id. at 340, 24 S.W. at 740.
53. See Rounds v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 64 N.Y. 129 (1876) (employer held
liable where employee removed trespasser from train by violently knocking him off
while train was still in motion); T. BATY, supra note 13, at 190.
54. In Healy v. City Passenger R.R., 28 Ohio St. 23 (1875), the court held that
the employer would be liable if the jury found that manner in which the conductor
intentionally ejected the plaintiff was negligent; the conductor allegedly had pushed
the plaintiff off a moving car for failure to pay his fare.
55. Rounds v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 64 N.Y. 129, 133-34 (1876); 2 F.
MECHEM, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1953 (2d ed. 1914).
56. See note 49 supra. The additional limitation of foreseeability of the act was
imposed in Wellman v. Pacer Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. en banc 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). The court's language appears to imply that motive to
further the interests of the employer is the underlying test of liability. See id. at 57.
1983]
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A major step was taken when the Haehl rule was interpreted to allow
recovery against an employer not only when there was no express authori-
zation of force but also when the assault itself was not made for the purpose
of furthering the employer's interests. In Maniaci v. Inter-Urban Express Co., 5 '
the plaintiff had received a shipment through the defendant carrier. The
plaintiff refused to sign a receipt for it, claiming that the shipment was
short. An employee of the defendant asked the plaintiff to come to the
company offices to discuss a settlement. When the plaintiff got near the
office, the employee confronted him and demanded that the plaintiff sign
the receipt. Under protest, the plaintiff started to comply when the em-
ployee drew a pistol and shot him in the chest and shoulder. The defendant
carrier contended that since the plaintiff was already signing the document,
the act of the employee in shooting him could have served no purpose of the
employer. The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed a ruling
that sustained the defendant's demurrer. 8
In Maniaci, liability was imposed on an employer although none of the
traditional principles for imputation of liability applied. There was neither
an express command for the assault nor an awareness on the part of the
employer that the assault would occur. There was no expectation or repre-
sentation that the employer would be bound by the act of the employee.
There was no contractual or absolute duty of protection. There was no
negligence in the hiring of the employee, and there was no implied author-
ity to do the act since it was not done to achieve a purpose that the em-
ployee was hired to do. In Maniaci, the supreme court finally abandoned
the notion of a metaphysical connection between authority and act and
recognized that the basis of liability was founded in public policy.59 While
there is language in Maniaci which might indicate that liability arose as a
result of a special duty imposed on common carriers,' the traditional basis
of such a heightened duty is the implied contract of safe passage6 and the
helplessness of a passenger once on board. 2 Since the plaintiff in Maniad
was not a passenger, the duty of common carriers could not be the basis of
the liability imposed. Moreover, later cases apply the principle of Maniaci
to noncarriers6
3
57. 266 Mo. 633, 182 S.W. 981 (en banc 1916).
58. Id. at 650, 182 S.W. at 985 (4-3 decision with two judges concurring in
result only).
59. Id. at 644, 182 S.W. at 983.
60. See id.
61. T. BATY, supra note 13, at 190-91.
62. Pendleton v. Kinsley, 19 F. Cas. 141, 146 (C.C.R.I. 1871) (No. 10,922);
Maniaci v. Inter-Urban Express Co., 266 Mo. 633, 655-56, 182 S.W. 981, 987 (en
banc 1916) (Woodson, CJ., dissenting). See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 16
(1881).
63. See Panjwani v. Star Serv. & Petroleum Co., 395 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1965);
Barger v. Green, 255 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App., K.C. 1953); Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning
Co., 224 Mo. App. 1168, 31 S.W.2d 242 (St. L. 1930).
[Vol. 48
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Whether Maniaci should be read to expand the concept of scope of
employment or to abandon the over-used concept in favor of a policy ap-
proach, it is clear that the court was willing to impose liability where liabil-
ity had not been imposed before. Since 1916, Maniaci has been both
followed and criticized. The remainder of this Comment will show that the
principle espoused in Maniaci is still being applied and that it should not
only be continued, but expanded.
III. THE MANIAC LINE OF CASES
In finding that the motive for the act was not determinative, the
Maniaci64 court approved the following language from Mechem on Agency:
[I]n general terms it may be said that an act is within the course of
the employment if (1) it be something fairly and naturally inci-
dent to the business, and if (2) it be done while the servant was
engaged upon the master's business and be done, although mistak-
enly or ill avisedly with a view to further the master's business or
from some impulse or emotion which naturally grew out of or was
incident to the attempt to perform the master's business, and did
not arise wholly from some external, independent, and personal
motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own
account.
65
Narrowly interpreted, Maniaci states that a common carrier is liable for
an unprovoked assault committed on or just outside the employer's prem-
ises by its employee against a legitimate patron-invitee when the assault
arises out of an attempt to settle a controversy concerning the employer's
business and is made by the person the plaintiff was directed to deal with in
order to settle the controversy. The result in the case may be in accord with
modern notions of fairness, but it cannot be deduced from most of the au-
thorities cited in the opinion without a leap of faith.66 Whatever the true
64. Maniaci v. Inter-Urban Express Co., 266 Mo. 633, 182 S.W. 981 (en banc
1916).
65. 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 55, § 1960, quoted in Maniaci, 266 Mo. at 649-50,
182 S.W. at 985.
66. An examination of the authorities cited in Maniaci reveals that, with one or
two exceptions, they do not support the result in the case. As previously discussed,
Maniaci did not involve a higher degree of care or absolute liability, as the court
implied, 266 Mo. at 644, 182 S.W. at 983, even though the defendant was a carrier.
The cases cited involve excessive violence used in treatment of passengers or tres-
passers, e.g., Whiteaker v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 252 Mo. 438, 160 S.W. 1009 (en
banc 1913) (plaintiff riding on top of car kicked off by conductor while train was
moving); Haehl v. Wabash R.R., 119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737 (1893) (defendant's
watchman shot and killed trespasser on defendant's bridge). Some of the cases in-
volve questions of employer liability where negligence caused the injury, e.g.,
O'Malley v. Construction Co., 255 Mo. 386, 164 S.W. 564 (1913); Garretzen v.
Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104 (1872).
The Maniaci court explained its reliance on Haehl. The court reasoned that
1983]
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rationale for the decision, it is broader than this narrow interpretation and
since liability was imposed in Haeh when the defendant's employee shot a trcs-
passer, liability should be imposed when the victim was a customer. 266 Mo. at
646-47, 182 S.W. at 984. The court ignored the necessary finding in Haehl that the
employee was authorized to use force in removing trespassers. The agent in Maniaci
was not authorized to use violence against customers.
The Maniaci court cited language from Rounds v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 64
N.Y. 129 (1876), to the effect that when a master puts an employee in a position of
responsibility and management, the master will be liable when the employee,
through lack of judgment or discretion, goes beyond his authority and inflicts an
unjustifiable injury on another. Maniaci, 266 Mo. at 647-48, 182 S.W. at 984. But
in Rounds, the employee was authorized to use force in such situations and the ques-
tion was whether the excessive force used could give rise to employer liability. 64
N.Y. at 136.
In support of its holding the Maniaci court also cited Otis Elevator Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 124 P. 707 (1912), and J. STORY, AGENCY § 453 (9th ed.
1882), for the proposition that a principal is responsible for the wrongful acts of its
agent because the principal holds the agent out to be competent and trusted and
therefore warrants his fidelity and good conduct. The California case was a suit
against a bank for cashing a "raised" check. The plaintiff was estopped from claim-
ing the bank was not justified in cashing the check since it had been raised by an
agent of the plaintiff whose duties included cashing such checks. While this reliance
argument is appropriate in a case of an agent's fraud, it is not authority for imposi-
tion of liability for an assault by an employee. See text accompanying notes 107-12
infra.
It is also easy to distinguish the language of Justice Cooley, quoted in Maniad:
The master is liable for the acts of his servant, not only when they are
directed by him, but also when the scope of his employment or trust is
such that he has been left at liberty to do, while pursuing or attempting to
discharge it, the injurious act complained of.
266 Mo. at 649, 182 S.W. at 985 (quoting 2 T. COOLEY, TORTS 1017 (3d ed. 1906))
(emphasis added). Cooley followed these words with examples of application of the
rule that were not cited in Maniaci. Cooley, for example, would apply the rule when
a merchant left a clerk in his store to sell goods, and the clerk, in order to make the
sale, misrepresented the quality of the goods. The merchant would be responsible
for the fraud. Similarly, when a railroad puts a conductor in charge of ejecting
trespassers and he purposefully and wrongfully ejects a passenger, or when excessive
violence is used to eject a trespasser, the railroad company would be made to re-
spond in damages. 2 T. COOLEY, supra, at 1017-18. In both of these situations the
employee was given authority to do the kind of act that gave rise to the injury. The
rule was based on an implied authority to do the act, id. at 1024, and should not be
applied unless the employee either was authorized to do the act or was acting, at
least in part, to further the interests of the employer.
The Maniaci court also quoted from Pierce on Railroads: "The company is liable
for the acts of its servants in the course of their employment, both in the rightful use
and in the abuse of the powers conferred upon them . . . ." 266 Mo. at 648, 182 S.W. at
985 (quoting E. PIERCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROADS 278 (1881)) (em-
phasis added). This language is also distinguishable. Pierce continues with the fol-
lowing statement, which was not included in the Maniaci opinion:
[Vol. 48
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss3/4
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
This rule applies where the servant exercises a power conferred by the company
on an occasion or under circumstances when its exercise is unlawful, as
when a conductor or other servant, having the power to remove passen-
gers from the company's carriages who have no right to remain in them,
removes a passenger who has such a right; and also when a servant so
authorized uses the power in a case when it is lawful to use it, but in an
unlawful manner, as with excessive force ....
E. PIERCE, supra at 278 (emphasis added). Pierce concluded that while authority to
use force could be inferred by an order which implies the use of force, express au-
thority was required to impose employer liability for acts on behalf of the company
which were not the kind of acts that the company itself lawfully could do. Id. at
279-80. In Maniaci, there was no allegation that the company had authorized its
agent to use violence if necessary to procure the receipt from the plaintiff. 266 Mo.
at 652, 182 S.W. at 986 (Woodson, C.J., dissenting). In addition, it was alleged that
the plaintiff was already giving the agent the requested signature, so the violence
could not be said to have been done in an effort to procure the signature for the
employer. See 266 Mo. at 641, 182 S.W. at 98.1.
There are two authorities cited in Maniaci that can be read to support the
result. Professor Mechem, in his work on agency, gave some general rules for deter-
mining whether an act is within the course of employment:
[A]n act is within the course of the employment if. . . it be done while
the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although
mistakenly or ill-advisedly. . . from some impulse or emotion which nat-
urally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's
business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent and
personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own
account.
F. MECHEM, supra note 55, § 1960. It is not clear what Mechem meant by this
general rule, as he neither explains it nor cites any authority for it. Due to the
similarity in language, it may be supposed that the rule was gleaned from Rounds
v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 64 N.Y. 129 (1876):
The master who puts the servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or
commits to him the management of his business or the care of his prop-
erty, is justly held responsible when the servant, through lack ofjudgment
or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of pas-
sion aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict
line of his duty or authority and inflicts an unjustifiable iijury upon
another.
Id. at 134. Thus it is possible that Mechem was referring to a case in which the
employer had given authority to the employee to use force in similar circumstances,
but the employee, spurred by the emotion of the situation, used more force than
was authorized. This is especially likely in light of Mechem's comment that the
limitations of employer liability should not be expanded except by legislation. 2 F.
MECHEM, supra note 55, § 1963.
The only authority cited in Maniaci that is unquestionably on point is
Richberger v. American Express Co., 73 Miss. 161, 18 So. 922 (1895). In that case,
the plaintiff alleged that he had been overcharged by defendant's agent and had
complained to the agent's superiors, that the agent then repaid the amount of the
overcharge and demanded a receipt, and that upon the plaintiff's signing and re-
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has been applied where the employer was not a common carrier,6 7 where
the assault arguably was not unprovoked,6 8 where the assault did not occur
on the defendant's premises,69 and where the victim had not been sent to
settle a controversy with anyone but was assaulted by the person with
whom the controversy arose.
70
In Doyle v. Scotts Cleaning Co, 71 an employee delivered some clothes to
the plaintiff's residence. The plaintiff had complained to her husband that
the deliveryman had been discourteous to her on a prior occasion. When
the husband answered the door he asked the employee (Appler) to be more
courteous in his conversation when delivering goods. Appler asked what
discourteous remarks were being referred to. The husband, thinking he
might be mistaken about Appler's identity, called his wife to the porch.
When the wife identified him as the discourteous employee, Appler got an-
gry and asked if they were looking for trouble. The plaintiff said no and
asked him to leave. Appler then struck the plaintiff in her face, knocking
her to the floor. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, citing Maniaci, found that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action against the employer under these
facts. 7
2
[T]he complaint made to . . . Appler, dealt with an alleged dis-
courtesy in his conduct of defendant's business. It is but natural
that plaintiff's husband would inquire of Appler regarding any
believed discourtesy on Appler's part to his wife which arose in
turning the receipt the agent immediately did "curse, abuse, insult, and maltreat
plaintiff because plaintiff had demanded and received ... said overcharge." Id. at
167, 18 So. at 922. The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that an express com-
pany was not subject to the higher common carrier standard of liability, but that
since it "opens its offices every day to thousands of citizens, in its dealings with
customers . . . it is bound . . . for respectful treatment and for decency of de-
meanor." Id. at 171, 18 So. at 923. The test was whether the act was done "in the
master's business." Id. at 169, 18 So. at 923. The court found that the "whole
transaction occurred in the shortest time, and was one continuous and unbroken
occurrence." Id. at 171, 18 So. at 923. It was therefore "impossible to say. . . that
the tort committed. . . because of the demand for the refunding of what was plain-
tiff's conceded due, was so separated in time or logical sequence as not to have been
done in the master's business." Id. Richberger thus would allow a customer to collect
from a business for an assault made by an agent that was neither authorized nor
done to serve the purposes of the employer.
67. See, e.g., Panjwani v. Star Serv. & Petroleum Co., 395 S.W.2d 129 (Mo.
1965).
68. See, e.g., Barger v. Green, 255 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App., K.C. 1953).
69. See, e.g., Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning Co., 224 Mo. App. 1168, 31 S.W.2d 242
(St. L. 1930).
70. See, e.g., Panjwani v. Star Serv. & Petroleum Co., 395 S.W.2d 129 (Mo.
1965); Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning Co., 224 Mo. App. 1168, 31 S.W.2d 242 (St. L.
1930).
71. 224 Mo. App. 1168, 31 S.W.2d 242 (St. L. 1930).
72. Id. at 1175, 31 S.W.2d at 245.
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connection with and out of the business done through Appler as
agent for the Scott's Cleaning Company. The adjustment of such
a complaint would be to the interest of the master's business, and
as the complaint arose out of the alleged conduct or action of Ap-
pier, it was not without reason that the matter in the first instance
should be called to his attention.7 3
In Barger v. Green," the plaintiff complained to the manager of the de-
fendant corporation about an alleged breach of contract. The manager re-
ferred the plaintiff to Green. During their conversation the plaintiff said to
Green, "I thought you were a man of your word. You can take your chick-
ens and go to hell with them." Green suddenly struck plaintiff on the left
side of his head with his fist. The plaintiff then said, "[D]on't hit me, I am
going out." As he was walking to the door, Green hit him again and
pushed him out the door and off a loading dock. The plaintiff broke his leg
near the hip. Although the assault took place at the termination of the
discussion, the Kansas City Court of Appeals found that the assault oc-
curred "as plaintiff was engaged in trying to settle a controversy concerning
a portion of plaintiffs business, on the premises, during working hours, and
with the employee to whom plaintiff had been sent to discuss the contro-
versy by the corporate defendant's manager."
75
The Barger court cited Doyle as authority for denying a motion for a
directed verdict for the defendant corporation. In spite of the defendant's
argument that a man should not be able to "come into a respectable place
of business and cause a disturbance and abuse people and start a fight and
then come back and. . collect a bill of damages after he gets hurt,, 76 the
court affirmed a $3,900 judgment for the plaintiff.
Doyle and Maniaci were criticized by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in
Tockstein v. PJ. Hamill Transfer Co., 7 which involved a suit for damages
against a transfer/delivery company for injuries incurred when the defend-
ant's employee struck the plaintiff in the face. The employee was making a
delivery to a hardware store. The plaintiff was a customer in the hardware
store. As the employee carried in a roll of woven wire fencing, he passed the
plaintiff and part of the wire scratched the plaintiff. The plaintiff told the
employee he should be more careful and the employee continued to the
back of the store. At the back of the store, the employee had a heated
argument with the store owner because the delivery had not been made
through the delivery door. The store owner threatened to report the em-
ployee to his employer. As the employee was leaving, he passed the plaintiff
again and said, "I suppose you want to make a report too." The plaintiff
decided to get the license number of the truck. At the curb, the plaintiff
73. Id. at 1174, 31 S.W.2d at 244.
74. 255 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App., K.C. 1953).
75. Id. at 131.
76. Id. at 129.
77. 291 S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Mo. App., St. L. 1956).
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passed in front of the employee, who struck him, fracturing his nose.78
The Tockstein court held that before an employer could be liable for an
assault by the employee, the assault must be "made with the intent to pro-
mote or further the master's business." 79 The court stated that Maniac" set
no precedent because it was a four-to-three decision with two judges con-
curring in the result only. Moreover, the Tockstein court stated that the
employee in Maniaci shot the plaintiff in an attempt to force the consignee
to do something for the benefit of the employer 8 -- contrary to the state-
ment in the Maniaci petition that the plaintiff was shot after he was already
complying with the employee's order.
8 1
The Tockstein court recognized that Doyle was on point but stated that
it should no longer be followed.8 2 Nonetheless, the Barger case, which fol-
lowed Doyle, was relied on by the Missouri Supreme Court in Panjwani v.
Star Service & Petroleum Co.,83 a unanimous decision. Panjwani involved a
personal injury suit by a customer who was assaulted by the defendant's
employee, a gas station attendant. The plaintiff had asked for one dollar's
worth of ethyl. After the employee had put the gasoline in plaintiff's car,
the plaintiff asked the employee to check the oil and rear tires. The em-
ployee became angry and used abusive language to the effect that he wasn't
about to check tires for a one dollar sale and that the plaintiff should "get
the hell out of here." The plaintiff asked to see the manager. On finding
that the defendant employee was the assistant manager, the plaintiff paid
him for the gasoline and started walking toward the office to get someone to
check the tires. The employee then struck the plaintiff with the nozzle of a
gas hose, fracturing the bones on the left side of his face.8 4
The defendant argued that because its employee had completed service
to the plaintiff and gone on to serve another customer, he was not acting in
the course and scope of his employment with the intent to promote its busi-
ness at the time of the assault.8 5 The supreme court held the employer
liable even though the sales transaction had been completed. The court
found that the plaintiff had made a submissible case of unprovoked assault
and battery, since the plaintiff was trying to settle a controversy concerning
the defendant company's business "on the premises, during working hours,
and with the employee to whom plaintiff had been sent to discuss the con-
troversy by the corporate defendant's manager."8 6 The Panjwani court did
not expressly overrule Tockstein but merely dismissed that case as not dispos-
78. Id. at 625.
79. Id. at 626.
80. I1d. at 627.
81. See Maniaci, 266 Mo. at 641-42, 182 S.W. at 981.
82. 291 S.W.2d at 627.
83. 395 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1965).
84. Id. at 131.
85. Id. at 130-31.
86. Id. at 131-32.
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itive of the issue.87 While the Panjwani court did not cite Maniaci, its reli-
ance on Barger is an approval of Doyle, which is an approval of Man'aci.
The Maniaci-Dovle-Barger-Panjwani line of cases leaves us with the rule
that when a dispute between a customer and an employee arises out of the
employer's business transaction with the customer, the employer will be
called on to answer for an assault by the employee that occurs during or
immediately after the customer's attempt to settle the controversy. In cases
outside of this "complaint case" setting, the supreme court has held that for
the employer to be vicariously liable for an employee's assault, the assault
must be made with an intent to further some interest of the employer.
8 8
The requirement of intent found in these cases stems from language found
in Haehl:
The principal is responsible, not because the servant has acted in
his name or under color of his employment, but because the ser-
vant was actually engaged in and about his business, and carrying
out his purposes; and it matters not in such case whether the in-
jury from which it is sought to charge him is the result of negli-
gence, unskillful or wrongful conduct, for he must choose fit
agents for the transaction of his business. But if his business is
done, or is taking care of itself, and his servant, not being engaged
in it, not concerned about it, but impelled by motives that are
wholly personal to himself, and simply to gratify his own feeling of
resentment, whether provoked or unprovoked, commits an assault
upon another, when that has and can have no tendency to pro-
mote any purpose in which the principal is interested, and to pro-
mote which the servant was employed, then the wrong is the
purely personal wrong of the servant . *...89
The basis of this language was that the employer was liable where he could
be said to have authorized the wrongful act. This rationale called for a
teleological test of liability; the employer could be held to have impliedly
authorized any act done by the employee if the act was done in an attempt
to do the job the master told him to do," but no authority would be im-
plied if the particular act was not done in an attempt to serve the master.
91
At the time of the Haehl decision, no authority was implied for unlawful
assaults that were not at least partially authorized.9 2
87. Id. at 132. Tockstein, unlike Panjwani, did not involve an invitee or patron
of the defendant corporation.
88. See State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 41 S.W.2d 801 (1931); see
also Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958).
89. 119 Mo. at 339, 24 S.W. at 740.
90. See Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 111 (1872); Douglass v. Stephens,
18 Mo. 362, 367 (1853).
91. See Douglass v. Stephens, 18 Mo. 362, 367 (1853); see also State ex rel. Gos-
selin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 768, 41 S.W.2d 801, 804; E. PIERCE, supra note 66, at
279-80.
92. See Jackson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 87 Mo. 422, 430 (1885); McKeon v.
Citizens Ry., 42 Mo. 79, 88 (1867). These authorities were cited by the defendant
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The broad language of Haeh19 3 apparently was read as imposing em-
ployer liability for any assault so long as it was committed with the purpose
of furthering the employer's interests.9 4 While such a reading would liber-
alize the old law by implying authority to use unlawful force-where only
express authorization to use force previously had been sufficient to impose
liability-it would limit the effect of Maniaci if applied in a complaint case.
The employer would be liable for an assault by his employee only if by
committing the assault the employee was doing something or thought he
was doing something he was hired to do, albeit in an unorthodox manner.
While Maniaci cited Haehl, the underlying rationales of the two cases are
different and may provide opposing results. In a later case imposing the
Haehl limitation, Maniaci was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff
in the later case was not an invitee-patron of the defendant.9 5
There are thus two theories of employer liability available in Mis-
souri.96 One rule imposes liability under a theory that ascribes the act of
the employee to the employer.9 7 By hiring an employee to do a job for him,
the employer has authorized the employee to do acts designed to achieve
the employer's purpose.9" Quifacitper alium, fadt per se. The theory underly-
ing the Maniaci line is more elusive.
As has been shown, the Maniaci rule does not proceed from most of the
precedents cited to support it.99 The Maniaci court introduced a new theory
of liability and clothed it with the language of established law. Liability
was imposed, not because the employee was doing something that the em-
ployer could be deemed to have ordered or authorized the employee to do,
but because the assault arose out of the employer's business. 0
in Haehl. Brief for Defendant at 30, Haehl. The court found that the evidence
brought "the case fairly within the principle" formulated by the defendants by find-
ing that the employee's duties involved the duty of putting trespassers off after they
got on. 119 Mo. at 340, 24 S.W. at 740.
93. The Haehl court concluded its discussion of employer liability by stating:
"[H]owever wanton or malicious the act . . . was, the principal is liable if it was
done in the course of the servant's employment." 119 Mo. at 341, 24 S.W. at 741.
94. See note 49 supra.
95. State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 765, 41 S.W.2d 801, 803
(1931).
96. This Comment will not attempt to reconcile these two theories under a
general all-inclusive theory.
97. The principal is liable because "the thing complained of, although done
through the agency of another, was done by himself." State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trim-
ble, 328 Mo. 760, 763, 41 S.W.2d 801, 802 (1931) (quoting Haehl, 119 Mo. at 339,
24 S.W. at 740).
98. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 395-96 (1954).
99. See note 66 supra.
100. See Maniaci, 266 Mo. at 644, 182 S.W. at 983.
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IV. BASIS OF LIABILITY
The Maniaci line of cases requires that the employer respond in dam-
ages not only for assaults that are made with the purpose, however mis-
guided, of furthering the employer's interests, but also for assaults inflicted
upon patrons of the employer when made at the termination of an attempt
to settle some controversy concerning the employer's business. While the
result may be in line with modern expectations, no Missouri case has clearly
articulated the basis for imposing such liability. Even the more recent com-
plaint cases cite decisions in which liability was imposed because the em-
ployee committed an assault with the purpose of furthering the employer's
interest as authority for imposing liability for an assault without finding such
a purpose. '
0 1
Courts have used the same precedents and language to find, in some
cases, that an employee could not be acting within the scope of employment
absent a purpose to serve the employer by the injurious act and, in others,
that the employer was liable notwithstanding the lack of such a purpose.
This has led to confusion over when an employer is liable for his employee's
assault.10 Such confusion can be cleared up by examining the true basis of
liability underlying the Maniaci line.
To find the basis of liability in these cases, it is perhaps easiest to begin
with what the basis cannot be. The traditional rationale for imposing vica-
rious liability on an employer was that the employer had "delegated to an-
other the doing of an act which, if done by himself would impose the duty
of care and prudence commensurate with the nature and requirements of
the work to be done."' 1 3 The employer is responsible because the employee
"was actually engaged in and about his business and carrying out his pur-
poses. He is then responsible because the thing complained of although
done through the agency of another, was done by himself."' 0 4 Even where
the employee disobeyed express orders about how a job was to be done,
liability was imposed because to do otherwise would nullify the doctrine-
every employer would tell his employees to act in a lawful, non-negligent
manner. 0 5 Thus where an assault was not made in an attempt to do the
employer's business the employer would not be liable.
In the complaint cases, the employees originally had been acting to
further the interests of the employer but at the time of the assault could not
101. See, e.g., Panjwani v. Star Serv. & Petroleum Co., 395 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo.
1965). The Panjwani court cited Haehi and Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316
S.W.2d 141 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958), cases which imposed liability for employee
assaults made for the purpose of furthering the employer's interest.
102. See note 106 infra.
103. Hinkle v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 199 S.W. 227, 229 (Mo. 1917) (citing Flor
v. Dolph, 192 S.W. 949, 951 (Mo. 1917)).
104. Haehl, 119 Mo. at 339, 24 S.W. at 740.
105. See Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. Derby, 1 U.S. (14 How.) 291 (1852);
Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 111 (1872).
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be said to be motivated by any purpose of the employer.' °6 Since, in the
complaint cases, the particular act was not done, even misguidedly, for the
benefit of the employer, liability under the traditional theory would not
attach to the employer.
At least one court has indicated that the employer's liability is based
on the reliance and confidence that the public has been invited to repose in
the employee, stating that in "every such case the principal holds out the
agent as competent and fitted to be trusted; and thereby in effect he war-
rants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope of his
agency."'" 7 This language was taken from Stog, on Agency.' ° 8 But Justice
Story clearly was referring to agents entering into contractual relations with
the plaintiff'0 9 and liability for breaches arising from the contract.' 10 That
Story's words were not meant to impose liability for an unauthorized willful
assault cannot be doubted." 1 Nonetheless, this misapplication of Story's
language at first glance provides a tempting theory of liability for assaults.
By inviting the public to do business at his store, the employer warrants
that his employees are safe to do business with. This theory, however, does
not help us define what acts are done in the scope of the employment.
Without some limitation, it would prove too much. Absolute liability for
acts of employees, such as that imposed on common carriers vis-a-vis pas-
sengers, has never been applied to shopkeepers." 2 Thus, liability as im-
posed in the complaint cases cannot be based on a warranty of safety to
customers entering a store.
A rationale that does explain liability of the employer in the complaint
cases, and that does not impose absolute liability on a business for all acts of
its employees, has been articulated by Justice Traynor and espoused by the
106. Some cases, however, present a fact situation that could give rise to a com-
plaint case but are decided on the ground that the assault could be found to have
been made in the interest of the employer. In Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316
S.W.2d 141 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958), a bus driver assaulted a person who had ac-
cused him of leaving the scene of an accident and who had called him a "lying
bastard." The court actually found that the driver might have committed the as-
sault in an effort to stay on schedule and not to vindicate his own outraged feelings.
Id. at 144.
107. Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning Co., 224 Mo. App. 1168, 1175, 31 S.W.2d 242,
245 (St. L. 1930).
108. J. STORY, supra note 66, § 452.
109. T. BATY, supra note 13, at 187.
110. Such liability might lie, for example, for negligent damage or loss of goods
committed to an agent, tortious conversion of goods entrusted to an agent, fraud,
and warranties of an agent. See J. STORY, supra note 66, § 453.
111. Closely following the excerpt under discussion, he wrote that "the principal
is never liable for the unauthorized, the wilful, or the malicious act or trespass of his
agent." Id. § 456. See T. BATY, supra note 13, at 187.
112. See Smothers v. Welch & Co. House Furnishings, Co., 310 Mo. 144, 149,
274 S.W. 678, 679 (1925).
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California courts. In Carr v. William C Crowell Co., 1 13 two carpenters, one
employed by the defendant contractor and the other employed by a differ-
ent contractor, had a disagreement about the way certain work was to be
done. The disagreement ended with the first employee throwing a hammer
at the second, seriously injuring him. The defendant claimed that the as-
sault was not made in the course and scope of the employment since it was
not intended to and could not further any interest of the defendant." 4 The
California Supreme Court held that liability could be imposed if the injury
merely resulted from a dispute arising out of the employment."' The court
based its holding partially on a provision of the California Civil Code, but
since that provision merely declared a principal liable for wrongful acts
committed "in and as a part of" the principal's business, 1 16 the court was
constrained to review case law on liability for assaults made in the scope of
employment.
As authority for imposing vicarious liability, the court cited various
complaint cases," 7 including the Missouri case of Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning
Co. 11 The California court did not adopt motive or concepts of warranty
and reliance as the basis for liability. It explained that the defendant's busi-
ness required the association of human beings and was attended by the risk
that someone might be injured. Quoting from an opinion written by Judge
Cardozo which defined the scope of employment for workers' compensa-
tion, the court continued:
Such associations "include the faults and derelictions of
human beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not
discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job
they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude.
Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies to careless-
ness and camaraderie, as well as emotional makeup. In bringing
men together, work brings these qualities together, causes friction
between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and
for fun-making and emotional flareup. Work could not go on if
men became automatons repressed in every natural expres-
sion. . . .These expressions of human nature are incidents insep-
arable from working together. They involve risks of injury and
these risks are inherent in the 
working environment."" 
9
113. 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946).
114. Id. at 654, 171 P.2d at 6-7.
115. Id., 171 P.2d at 7.
116. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2338 (West 1954).
117. Among the cases cited was Stansell v. Safeway Stores, 44 Cal. App. 2d 822,
113 P.2d 264 (1941), in which the court imposed liability on an employer when one
of its managers quarreled with a customer over an order and, after an exchange of
epithets, chased her outside the store and injured her.
118. 224 Mo. App. 1168, 31 S.W.2d 242 (St. L. 1930).
119. 28 Cal. 2d at 656, 171 P.2d at 7-8 (quoting Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk
Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 472, 128 N.E. 711, 713 (1920)).
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The policy becomes clear. When an employer requires interpersonal
contact in order to conduct his business, at some point the business may
give rise to disruptions, complaints, and arguments. Since an employer's
business is dependent on human beings and not machines to function, the
business should bear the risk of human emotion just as it bears the risk of
human carelessness. Where an employer's business has given rise to an ar-
gument, as where a customer is trying to settle a complaint, but the em-
ployee will not or can not give the customer satisfaction, the employer
should not be able to remove himself from the situation his business has
created by claiming his business had terminated when the two reached an
impasse. The Maniad court cited this justification when it stated:
[A]n act is within the course of employment if. . . it be done.. .
with a view to further the masters' interests, or from some impulse
or emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the
attempt to perform the master's business, and did not arise wholly
from some external, independent and personal motive on the part
of the servant to do the act upon his own account.'
20
This theory does not impose the equivalent of absolute liability on the
employer. Liability would be imposed only when the emotion giving rise to
the assault arises from and is incident to the work performed for the em-
ployer. Thus, while this rationale would impute liability for an indecent
assault committed by an employee out of anger arising out of his work , 2 1 it
would not impute liability for a similar assault where no work-related dis-
pute preceded the assault.' 22 This theory requires only that an enterprise
be charged with the cost of those injuries attributable to its activities.' 23
Some states have refused to follow Carr, noting that Justice Traynor
relied in part on a California statute 124 or arguing that such a major change
in employer liability is a decision for the legislature to make.' 25 Other
courts have cited the decision favorably,' 26 and it has been the subject of
120. 266 Mo. at 649-50, 182 S.W. at 985.
121. See Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rape by deliveryman
arose out of dispute over delivery; employer held liable).
122. See Alma W. v. Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 176 Cal. Rptr.
287 (1981) (school janitor's indecent assault of young girl not result of emotions
aroused by employment).
123. Id. at 139, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
124. See, e.g., Lepore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 207 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. Ct. App. 1965);
Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274, 279, 600 P.2d 679, 682-83 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 569, 154 N.W.2d 113, 122
(1967). The Sandman court refused to hold the employer liable unless the employee
was engaged in furthering the employer's interests. Id. at 564, 154 N.W.2d at 117.
126. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d
Cir. 1968) (motive test inadequate; government liable for acts of drunken seaman);
Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 405, 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1973)
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vigorous dissent where it has not been followed.12 7 Other courts have aban-
doned the motive requirement without benefit of the Carr decision.'
28
Missouri courts already have abandoned motive as the test of employer
liability in limited circumstances and have imposed liability where an as-
sault by an employee was made out of anger arising out of an employer's
business. The task that now faces the courts is to develop a rationale that
will reconcile the cases and give some predictability to the concept of em-
ployer liability.
A full scale adoption of the California rationale would broaden the
liability that has been recognized in the Missouri complaint cases. Missouri
has limited this extended liability to cases in which a legitimate patron of the
employer's business has been attempting to settle some controversy with the
(employer liable where argument that precipitated assault concerned employee's
conduct in his work).
One case that appears to abandon the "furtherance of employer's interest"
test-but does not-is Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363
(1948). The Tn-State court stated that an act may be within the scope of authority
"and yet not be in the interest of the principal or in prosecution of the principal's
business," id. at 306, 49 S.E.2d at 366, and cited California law, id. at 308-09, 49
S.E.2d at 368. It found that a bus company was liable for an assault by one of its
drivers which occurred after the bus had stopped while making a turn. The court
noted, however, that no liability would have arisen if the turn had been negotiated
completely and the driver had returned immediately to the scene and committed
the tort to gratify his hostile feelings. Id. at 305, 49 S.E.2d at 366. Apparently the
court found that the assault was made to allow the driver to continue serving the
employer.
127. See, e.g., Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 576, 154 N.W.2d 113, 122
(1967) (Becker, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co., 102 Conn. 696, 701, 129 A. 778,
780 (1925) (argument and assault were "one continuous transaction"); Lyon v. Ca-
rey, 533 F.2d 649, 652 (D.C. App. 1976) (employer liable for rape by deliveryman
after dispute over delivery; "dispute arose out of the very transaction which had
brought. . . [deliveryman] to the premises"); Dilli v. Johnson, 107 F.2d 669 (D.C.
App. 1939) (complaining customer beaten by employee; insufficient break in con-
nection when anger led to assault); Metzler v. Layton, 373 Ill. 88, 91, 25 N.E.2d 60,
61 (1939) (principal/agent relationship "existed . . . in respect to the particular
transaction out of which the injury arose"); New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart,
123 Ky. 8, 13, 93 S.W. 598, 600 (1906) (employer liable where "agent begins a
quarrel while acting within the scope of agency, and immediately follows it up by a
violent assault'); Richberger v. American Express Co., 73 Miss. 161, 18 So. 922
(1896) (sales clerk assaulted customer after clerk had refunded money overcharged);
Kornec v. Mike Horse Min. & Mill Co., 120 Mont. 1, 10, 180 P.2d 252, 257 (1947)
("act complained of arose out of and was committed in prosecution of the task the
servant was performing for his master'); Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 86 Nev.
390, 392, 469 P.2d 399, 400 (1970) (card dealer struck obnoxious patron without
leaving his position behind card table; when assault is "so inextricably intertwined




Burns: Burns: Employer Liability for Assaults by Employees
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
employee.' 2 9 Justice Traynor's theory apparently would permit recovery
by anyone assaulted as a result of emotions engendered by the employer's
business.
The reason for limiting the ability to recover to legitimate patrons of
the employer is unclear. At one point, the rule appeared limited to invi-
tees"O until this proved to be too narrow."' Some language appears to
base the limitation on an employer's duty to an invitee-patron or his im-
plied warranty that his employees are safe to do business with. These argu-
ments may be akin to reliance arguments made to hold a principal liable
for contracts of his factor but are not consistent with the manner in which
liability is imposed. If an employer were liable because of a duty to an
invitee or a warranty of safety, an employer would be liable for all assaults
made on his premises by an employee during working hours against invitee-
patrons. No case has adopted such a strict liability approach. The limita-
tion appears to be the result of judicial attempts to fit round pegs of new
concepts into square holes of precedent. They can be made to fit, but the
gaps are not filled.
Whether Missouri continues to limit recovery to patrons in a com-
plaint setting or recognizes a broader liability where emotions engendered
by the employer's business give rise to an assault, the courts should not rely
on language from cases in which the assault was for the purpose of further-
ing the employer's interests to impose liability in a case in which the assault
was not so motivated. The cases are not completely incompatible, but the
basis of liability is different. The language can give rise to
inconsistencies.' 3
2
If the California rationale is adopted, the patron limitation could still
be applied. The California rationale is rooted in public policy, and it may
be the policy of Missouri courts to expand employer liability only where
there is an element of reliance on the part of the injured party that the
employee is safe to do business with. This reliance factor, though not suffi-
cient to provide the basis of liability, could provide a limit of liability.'13
129. See State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 765, 41 S.W.2d 801, 803
(1931).
130. See Maniaci v. Inter-Urban Express Co., 266 Mo. 633, 646-47, 182 S.W.
981, 984 (en banc 1916); see also State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 765,
41 S.W.2d 801, 803 (1931).
131. See Doyle v. Scott's Cleaning Co., 224 Mo. App. 1168, 1173-74, 31 S.W.2d
242, 244 (St. L. 1930).
132. Compare State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 769, 41 S.W.2d 801,
805 (1931) (assault not perpetrated with aim to further employer's interests is not
done within scope of employment), with Barger v. Green, 255 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1953) (assault could be within scope of employment if employee acting
to further employer's interests just before assault commenced).
133. Another possible justification for such a limitation might be the distribu-
tion of losses theory mentioned in another context in Seavey, supra note 7, at 450.
The business enterprise can shift the cost of liability to its customers through price
[Vol. 48
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Finally, the California rationale is not contrary to the result in Wellman
v. Pacer Oil Co. 134 In a four-to-three decision, the Missouri Supreme Court
in Wellman held that some acts are so outrageous (a gas station attendant
shot a complaining customer) that the act is unforeseeable and cannot be
deemed to be within the scope of employment. 3 5 1Wellman involved an as-
sault that probably was not done in furtherance of the employer's interests,
but the court did not reach that issue. While the Wellman rule seems inap-
propriate for acts found to be done in an attempt to further the employer's
interests, 136 the foreseeability limitation is not inconsistent with the public
policy "risk of the business" theory propounded by Justice Traynor.1
37
The Wellman decision is a good example of the confusion that can arise
if the basis of liability is not clear. While it was a case in which the act
could hardly be said to have been done in furtherance of the employment,
the plaintiffs apparently felt constrained to argue on appeal that their facts
not only could fit the complaint case type of action but also could fit case
law built around similar facts though based on a finding of intent to serve
the employer.'3 8 While the court did not limit prior case law which im-
increases. Therefore the benefit of such self-insurance could be limited to those who
are patrons and who ultimately bear its cost.
134. 504 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. en banc 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
135. Id. at 58.
136. The rule, if applied to such acts, appears to be a vestige of the in-
tent/negligence distinction announced in Wright v. Wilcox, 19"Wend. 343 (N.Y.
1838). See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra. Wilcox held an employer not liable
for an unauthorized willful wrong; the Wellman rule holds an employer not liable
for more serious willful wrongs. If, however, the basis of employer liability for acts
done in furtherance of the employer's interests is implied authority, an ascription of
the act to the employer, the distinction between minor wrong and major wrong is
hardly more logical than the old distinction between negligence and intent. Inter-
estingly, the comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 231 (1958),
which espouse the distinction, merely restate the rule without supplying a rationale
and give examples of its application. While the outrageousness or unforeseeability
of an act may be evidence that it was not done in furtherance of the employer's
interest, the classification of the action is irrelevant if motive to serve the employer
is established.
137. The policy can be said to be that where a business puts people together, the
risk of foreseeable human reactions to business operations should be borne by the
business, but the risk of unforeseeable reactions might not be. One court has de-
scribed a policy of imposing liability on the business where the emotions and assault
were "not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include . . . it among
other costs of the employer's business." Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal.
App. 3d 608, 619, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148-49 (1975).
138. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Wellman v. Pacer Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 55
(Mo. en banc 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). In addition to citing true
complaint cases such as Panjwani, the plaintiffs cited Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 316 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958), for the proposition that the employee,
in shooting the plaintiff after a complaint, was acting in the scope of the employ-
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posed employer liability where an assault by an employee may not have
been done to serve the interests of the employer, 139 the court's authority for
its foreseeability limitation was based on the assumption that motive is de-
terminative."4° Indeed, one of the reasons given for the rule adopted in
Wellman is that the outrageousness of a certain act is evidence that the "ser-
vant is not actuated by an intent to perform the employer's business."'
14 1
V. CONCLUSION
We would be better off without terms like "scope of employment," dum
fervet opus, respondeat superior, and quifacit per allur facit per se. Legal jargon
and Latin phrases may give comfort, but they do not solve problems.' 4 2
Such terms may provide valuable flexibility in judicial decisionmaking, 14 3
but eventually they become stumbling blocks in the pathway ofjuristic pro-
gress.' The Maniaci court used the play in the joints to impose liability in
a new situation. Sixty-seven years later the flexibility of the Maniaci lan-
guage has left inconsistencies and uncertainty in the law of employer
liability.
If the term "scope of employment" is to continue to be used, it should
mean something. The definition suggested by some of the cases is workable.
For purposes of attributing liability for an assault, an act is done in the
scope of employment if it is done in furtherance of the employer's interest
and the employee was hired to promote that interest. At the same time,
courts should not be hesitant to recognize that at times they impose liability
on an employer for acts done outside the scope of employment as so defined.
This would be preferable to-and more honest than-the historic practice
ment. Also cited were Simmons v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 104 S.W.2d 357
(Mo. 1937) (excessive force used to chase pranksters away from employer's store
front); Haehl v. Wabash R.R., 119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737 (1893) (employer liable
when guard used excessive force in removing trespasser from bridge).
139. The Welman majority appears to refer to the prior complaint cases as
though they were decided on the basis that where one of the employee's duties is to
handle complaints, and a complaint ends in an assault on a customer, the employer
is liable because this was the employee's way of handling the matter for the em-
ployer. 504 S.W.2d at 57. This may be due to the fact that respondent's brief in
Wellman relied both on Panjwani, a complaint case, and Bova, which was not a true
complaint case. See note 138 supra. By trying to fit the facts of Wellman into both
rationales, respondents understandably appear to have confounded the issues.
140. For example, the Wellman court relied primarily on the language of the
Restatement (Second), which espoused the view that "intent to serve his master" is
a prerequisite to imposing liability on an employer for a tortious act of an em-
ployee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958).
141. 504 S.W.2d at 58 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235
comment c (1957)).
142. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE LJ. 105, 107 (1916).
143. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 473; Seavey, supra note 7, at 453.
144. Laski, supra note 142, at 107.
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of changing the definition to make the ancient formula fit modern social
policy. The courts could then work out limitations and exceptions that are
consistent with the claimed basis of liability.
JEFFREY A. BURNS
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